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Japan is considered to be the most highly robotized society in the world, which at 
the industrial level at least is certainly true. There are presently some 250,000 
industrial robots employed in Japan, which is more than in any other country, and 
this number is expected to double in less than five years, and quadruple in ten. 
Furthermore, according to a claim that has been around at least since the early 
1960s, there is a ‘love story’ between Japan and robots (Koestler 1960). The 
Japanese are said to love robots, while Westerners tend to fear or at least to be 
wary of them, and many studies show that social acceptance of robots is higher in 
Japan than in Europe (Hornyak 2006). Japanese newspapers are always eager to 
report that someone invented a robot for making sushi or a robotic bed for elderly 
patients that transforms into a wheelchair. Robots in everyday life are seen as 
useful helpers rather than potentially dangerous rivals. 
However, for those of us who live there, the presence of robots in 
everyday life is not so evident. It is not clear to me that there are more robots in 
my normal environment in Japan, than what I find when I go to France or Canada. 
The love story between Japan and robots may be true, but it seems to be taking 
place at the level of cultural representations more than that of daily experience. 
Part of the explanation for the apparent discrepancy between the number of robots 
in Japan and the daily experience of robots, may simply be the lack of social 
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visibility of most robots. Unless you are a factory worker, encounters with 
industrial robots are rare events. Most robots remain hidden in industrial plants, 
where most of us rarely see them, or inside hospitals or other health care service 
facilities, where their use is reserved for specialized personnel and particular 
populations, i.e. elderly persons, sick children or patients with particular diseases. 
Robots may be numerous in Japan, but they usually fulfill specific functions in 
private locations and rarely directly interact or interfere with the general public. 
What Is a Robot? 
There are other reasons, I believe, why robots tend to remain invisible in our 
societies. The first is that the answer to the question ‘What is a robot?’ is far from 
clear. The second closely related reason is that in spite of the fact that the answer 
is not clear, or perhaps because it is not clear, we, the general public, tend to have 
pretty specific ideas about what is and what is not a robot. It follows that very 
often, because it does not fit our preconceived idea of what a robot is, we do not 
recognize a robot when we see one! For example, in French we call a food 
processor a ‘kitchen robot’ (un robot de cuisine). At first sight this is a bit 
surprising; a food processor does not really correspond to what most of us 
imagine when we think of a robot. What first comes to mind is usually something 
like Asimo, the Honda-built humanoid robot, or Aibo, the robotic dog from Sony. 
Both seem better candidates for what we expect a robot to be. Perhaps a Roomba 
vacuum cleaner or a robotic lawn mower would also do the trick. However, when 
you think of it, a food processor satisfies pretty well the original definition of the 
word ‘robot’: a worker, conceived as an automatic, self-powered device that 
replaces a human worker and that is to some extent autonomous. A food processor 
works for you in the kitchen. It cuts things up, or purees them, or whips up a 
mayonnaise. 
The fact is that most robots do not have a humanoid shape. Drones and 
other types of unmanned land, marine, or airborne vehicles are robots. Resyone, 
the robotic healthcare device made by Panasonic that transforms from a bed into 
an electric reclining chair, is a robot. Industrial and medical robots come in forms 
and shapes determined by their particular use or function, and more often than not 
they look like just any other machine. That is to say there is nothing particular in 
their appearance that picks them out as a robot. 
The question which this diversity raises is, are all automated devices 
robots? Is an automatic door opener a robot? Is the automatic pilot in a plane that 
can keep it flying for hours with little human intervention a robot? Is an escalator 
a robot? What about a moving sidewalk or an automatic vending machine? Is the 
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sensor that turns the light on at night when someone approaches a robot or not? Is 
the automatic wicket that reads your magnetic card and lets you in at a subway 
station a robot? Is a driverless subway train a robot? Is an automated teller 
machine a robot? Is a food processor a robot? How about your dishwasher? Is the 
printer attached to your computer a robot? The list can easily continue, so where 
do we stop? And if we do, how do we draw the line between robots and other 
types of automated device? And if we don’t stop, then it seems that robots are 
everywhere in the modern world, so present that we don’t even see them anymore, 
and the word ‘robot’ would then refer to so many things, that it would not mean 
anything in particular. 
 The answer to the question, ‘is this or that object a robot?’ is far from clear, 
because among other things the concept of robot itself is not very clear. The word 
was invented—or rediscovered—for a play, as the generic name of fictional 
characters and not as a scientific category. In Karel Čapek’s R.U.R. (Rossum’s 
universal robots), robots are artificial biological—rather than mechanical—
creatures: they are androids made of synthetic biological material. They are 
indistinguishable from humans and work for us, as secretaries, gardeners, servants, 
factory workers or whatever we may need, until of course the day inevitably 
comes when they rebel and destroy the human race. Hence robots are artificial 
agents that work, that perform some function in our stead and that enjoy some 
autonomy in doing so. This last point, relative autonomy, is what distinguishes 
robots from ordinary machines or first generation automated tools, that is, 
automated tools that are entirely dependent on human workers to accomplish their 
task, like an electric saw or lawn mower. The word ‘robot’ and the idea remained, 
but the synthetic biological origin of robots was forgotten. Robots came to be 
understood as automated mechanical devices that replace human workers, or 
accomplish their function, something which by definition requires at least a 
minimum of autonomy. The difficulty with this definition and way of 
understanding what a robot is, comes from the fact that it mingles two very 
different types of criteria. First, an engineering mechanical criterion: an 
autonomous automated device; and second, a social functional criterion: that 
works in our place. If ‘work’ is a well-defined scientific concept, in physics for 
example, fulfilling a human task is not. 
 The fact is that there are many ways of doing the same thing, especially 
when doing the same thing is understood as obtaining the same or a similar result. 
Imagine someone who is hired to carve floral patterns on soaps in a factory. The 
owner can replace him or her, or more precisely dispense with this worker, simply 
by having molds made such that the soaps come out with the patterns already on. 
Another way of reaching a similar result is to buy and install an automated soap 
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carver which fulfills the function of the human carver. The first solution may be 
understood as a way of automating the production line, in the sense that the 
desired result is automatically obtained through the production process without 
any particular agent’s intervention. The second consists in replacing a human 
agent by an artificial agent, a ‘robot soap carver’. The artificial agent must be able 
to do some of the things the human agent was doing; to recognize a bar of soap 
when there is one in its field of perception, to pick it up and carve it, probably to 
be able to determine the size of the soap and modulate its carving or choice of 
pattern in consequence, perhaps also to recognize the density of different soaps 
and adjust its activity to obtain better results, and so on. The machine must also be 
able to do this by itself (i.e. autonomously, without constant human supervision). 
Why Robots? 
Now robots, unlike human soap carvers, do not get tired (though they do break 
down), they do not complain, they do not get distracted and they do not go on 
strike. These are some of the reasons why we want robots and resort to them in 
various circumstances. Yet only some of the reasons; robots are also cheaper, and 
often more efficient or precise than human workers, they do not require retirement 
plans, and they do not have legal rights. That is to say, we want robots to have all 
the qualities (and more) that masters look for in slaves, or factory owners in 
workers, or commanders in soldiers (Arkin 2009); but none of what they see as 
their failings, weaknesses or insubordination. In other words, there are many 
dimensions of human autonomy which we do not want robots to have. Thus, we 
want robots both to be and not to be autonomous. It is this contradiction which is 
at the heart of Čapek’s early fable, where robots are just like us, but different, 
until they reveal themselves to be too much like us and decide to wage war upon 
their masters! This contradictory project is also, I believe, what explains the 
permanence of the theme of the robots’ rebellion. Roboticists, and others who 
write or reflect upon robots, for example Wendell Wallach and Colin Allen in 
Moral Machines, often repeat, and sometimes lament, that at the present time and 
for the foreseeable future, we are unable to create really autonomous machines, 
for example, artificial agents that are sufficiently autonomous to be morally 
responsible agents (Wallach & Allen 2009; see also Lin, Abney & Bekey 2012). 
This is certainly the case. However, the truth also is that we do not want to create 
truly autonomous artificial agents; we are afraid of them. 
Many examples from popular Western culture bear witness to this refusal 
and fear. One of our greatest fears, since Čapek first introduced the term ‘robot’, 
and when the project of creating artificial agents became culturally plausible, is 
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that if robots someday become ‘really’ or ‘completely’ autonomous, if they 
become ‘like us’, they will destroy us and take over the world. Short stories like 
Algis Budrys’s ‘First to serve’ (1960: 73–86), films like Blade Runner, The 
Matrix, Terminator, and more recently Transcendence, essays like Bill Joy’s 
‘Why the future doesn’t need us’ (Joy 2000), or the popular idea of ‘the 
singularity’ all explore, exploit and construct this apocalyptic fear as a central 
theme in contemporary Western culture: when robots become conscious and 
autonomous, it will be the end of the world as we know it. 
Autonomous robots have long existed in Japanese manga and anime. 
Beginning with Astro Boy in the early 1950s, autonomous robots have generally 
been construed as good and helpful, even as heroes and saviors. In fact, Astro Boy 
is different from the other robots that are present in the story, because he has a 
soul. In consequence he is more human-like than other machines. This gives him 
greater insights into reality and makes him superior to other robots—though his 
incredible strength and power also help—but his human likeness also makes Astro 
Boy vulnerable to mistakes, to doubt and inner suffering. In spite of all his power, 
this robot, this artificial creature, is a lot like us. He shares many of our failings 
and weaknesses, and his being like us is what allows him to become a real hero 
and a successful ambassador for peace. There also are evil robots in Astro Boy, 
but their evilness usually comes from the bad intentions and goals of their creators. 
Robots can be evil, but they are not evil in themselves, and certainly not as a 
consequence of becoming autonomous. To the contrary, Astro Boy’s greater 
autonomy makes him more reflexive, complex and sensitive to moral issues. A 
somewhat similar position is adopted by Akira Toriyama in his famous manga 
Dragon Ball where some robots are evil because of who created them, but robots 
are not evil in themselves. 
 The theme of the danger posed by autonomous robots because they are 
autonomous is less present in Japanese popular culture. It is however not entirely 
absent, for example at the beginning of the film Patlabor 2, the opening scene 
where the robotic suit of the captured rebel labor turns out to be empty suggests 
that labors, robotic external skeletons and armor can become autonomous, take 
action on their own even when there is no driver inside, and in consequence 
become dangerous.1 Yet, in this case at least this theme is not followed up and the 
central argument of the film is quite different. The idea that the world will be 
taken over by machines, and that robots are the vanguard, or at least important 
agents of that invasion, though present in Japanese manga, films and anime, does 
not constitute a central theme in many or most of them. Popular science fiction 
																																								 																				
1	See	for	example	Bolton	(2007).	
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stories that involve robots have generally been more attentive to the psychological 
and ethical issues related to the ability to wield formidable power that robots 
confer upon human beings, than to intrinsic danger of technology or of robots as 
such. This said, the point is not to oppose Japanese popular culture to Western 
popular culture (many counter-examples could be found on both sides), but to 
distinguish between two different attitudes towards robots and technology. 
While Astro Boy is an autonomous robot, the robots in PatLabor, Gundam 
or Neon Genesis Evangelion, are vehicles and weapons, semi-autonomous 
machines whose common characteristic is that they are inhabited (driven) by 
humans—usually adolescents—who use them to fight evil and protect humanity. 
The human driver constitutes the brain and soul of the machine and the robot in 
return transforms the personality of its driver, makes him or her into someone 
different, occasioning in consequence severe psychological conflicts for the driver. 
As noted by many critics, problems of identity among adolescents often constitute 
one of the major themes of these stories (Napier 2007). Sometimes, as in 
Evangelion, the machine itself, the Eva01, has a soul of its own. In this case, the 
machine’s soul is that of the mother of the driver, Shinji, and for him the 
experience of driving the robot and combat is also that of becoming one with 
himself and with the machine’s soul. The important point is that in all these cases 
either the robot itself (as in Astro Boy) or the coupling of the driver and the 
machine (as in Gundam or Evangelion) constitutes an individual and the story 
describes the progressive individuation of the agent; him or her gaining, or failing 
to gain, a strong identity. The experience—either of the autonomous system itself, 
or that of living in a close, nearly symbiotic relationship with a technical object—
constitutes a learning and growing process. In many ways these stories resemble 
apprenticeship novels (Bildungsroman).  
To the contrary, in films like The Matrix or Terminator humans are 
originally the victims of their excessive confidence in and dependence on 
technology. When the film begins they are already suffering the disastrous 
consequences of their lack of foresight, and the gist of the story is their efforts at 
trying to escape if possible the terrible disasters their shortsightedness brought 
upon them. Instead of learning from their encounter with technology and 
becoming better through it, humans have as a consequence of their faith in and 
dependence on technology lost sight of what is important. Now that they have 
been punished for it, they must try to recover what has been lost. Rather than an 
apprenticeship novel, what we are given here is a cautionary tale. Beyond that 
difference in the literary genre there is also a fundamental difference in the way 
technology and robots are presented. In these films, robots do not constitute 
individuals. The enemy against which the hero fights is no so much the individual 
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robots he encounters as the ‘system’, the matrix or Sky net. The evil that befalls 
us is carried out by individual agents, but it springs from the ‘system’, from 
technology as a whole which has become autonomous and has taken over the 
world. ‘Agent Smith’ and the ‘terminator’ are only foot soldiers of a much more 
powerful entity, omnipresent and quasi-omnipotent, that directs their smallest 
moves. These machines may be autonomous in a sense, but not in another; they do 
not evolve towards autonomy or gain an identity,2 but remain remote controlled 
devices, even if like agent Smith, defective ones.  
This failure of autonomy and absence of individuality in many popular 
representations of robots and technology is also manifest in another way, through 
the incident that constitutes the beginning argument of the film. On some fateful 
day Sky Net became conscious and the same more or less happened for the Matrix. 
How did it happen? We don’t know, but by what we are told, it just took place by 
itself. At some point, the system reached a threshold of complexity and 
interconnections, and that was it! Nobody did it! In contrast, Astro Boy is created 
by a solitary scientist who has lost his son in a traffic accident. In Gundam the 
first mechanical suit is built in a secret underground laboratory by the father of the 
main protagonist, who dies in the attack that opens the story and gives his son the 
plans for the machine. In Evangelion the Evas are created by the father and 
mother of Shinji, the main protagonist, and Eva01 which he operates is inhabited 
by his dead mother’s soul. Apart from the importance of the parent/child 
relationship, in all these stories the fact is that the machine—the robot, combat 
suit or the bio-mechanical entity ‘Eva’—is the defining technological 
breakthrough which makes the story possible. Morever, it is always created by 
someone, an individual with a name, who often also plays an important role in the 
plot beyond that of the inventor of the machine. 
Technological systems like the Matrix or Sky Net may be ‘autonomous’ in 
a sense, but they are anonymous and they are not individuals. Rather, they 
constitute the environment within which individuals act, but an environment 
whose main characteristic is apparently to eradicate all traces of individuality, 
either by replacing humans with machines that the system directly controls, or by 
enslaving humans to its own purposes. On the contrary, in the Japanese manga 
and anime mentioned above, technology tends to constitute the triumph of 
individuality in at least three complementary but related senses. First, the central 
technology is the technical triumph of an individual, a major technical success 
																																								 																				
2	This	is	particularly	true	of	Agent	Smith,	who	when	he	escapes	the	control	of	the	Matrix	appears	
in	endless	copies	of	himself	like	a	computer	virus.	Only	the	recycled	terminator	from	Terminator1	
gives	in	Terminator	2	some	signs	of	developing	an	identity,	but	precisely	because	he	is	now	free	
from	the	control	of	Skynet.	
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achieved by someone. Second, it constitutes the occasion for the main 
protagonist—and often for others also—to triumph over him or herself, to face his 
or her fears, to resolve inner conflicts and to become a truly autonomous 
individual. Third and finally, it allows him or her to triumph in combat, to become 
a hero.  
These two popular images and evaluations of robots and technology could 
hardly be more different: robots are evil as opposed to good or morally neutral; 
dangerous products of failure worthy of moral censure as opposed to technologies 
that occasion moral growth and provide opportunities to become better people; 
alienation and impersonality, as opposed to the triumph of individuality.  
There is another fundamental difference between these two popular 
images of robots and technology. The first image of robots in Japan, found in 
many popular Japanese manga and anime, provides answers to such questions as: 
why do we want robots? What is good in technology? Overall that answer is: 
‘Robots and technology can make us better humans’. On the other hand, the 
image that is conveyed by many popular Western films and stories, which repeat 
and expand on Čapek’s original fear,3 does not answer those questions. In fact, the 
second image I listed, from the Western perspective, gives us many reasons for 
why we should not want to have robots, and why we should be wary of 
technological growth. Simultaneously, it paradoxically suggests that these 
questions do not really arise because this transformation will happen by itself. The 
bleak future which these films describe is not necessarily presented as inevitable, 
but technological growth or the ‘rise of the machines’ is viewed as an impersonal, 
autonomous (in the sense of automatic) process for which no one is responsible, 
and which no one can control or radically change.  
Individual Artificial Agents and Systemic Agents  
These different cultural representations of robots and of technology do not simply 
correspond to different ways of understanding technology and our relation with 
artificial agents. They also illustrate—in a dramatic and obscure way—differences 
in researchers’ goals and objectives, and further reflect real differences in existing 
technologies. They reflect different social technologies, in the sense that these 
different types of technologies correspond to different strategies relative to the 
role of modern technology in social control. 
																																								 																				
3	Probably	not	quite	Čapek's	'original	fear'.	The	play	was	written	in	the	1920s	and	it	seems	pretty	
clear	that	in	R.U.R.	robots	and	their	rebellion	are	metaphors	for	the	working	class.	However,	this	
meaning	was	rapidly	forgotten	and	the	play	was	understood	as	a	precautionary	tales	concerning	
modern	technology	and	the	'rise	of	the	machines'.	
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One possible definition of an autonomous robot is that it is a three-
dimensional physical system—something which distinguishes and separates 
robots from virtual agents on computer screens—that can sense and respond to its 
environment and whose responses are (to some extent) under its own control, in 
the sense that the agent can learn and is adaptable, hence the system is not and 
cannot be entirely pre-programmed. Depending on the technical characteristics of 
the system and/or on the social and technical environment in which it is active, the 
robot’s margin of autonomy can be larger or smaller. 
Given this understanding of an autonomous robot, is the autopilot in a 
modern plane an autonomous robot? It certainly is a three dimensional physical 
system; it can also sense its environment and respond to it, adjusting the altitude, 
trajectory, tilt and yaw of the plane in response to changes in the environment. Its 
responses are not entirely predetermined: there is no complete map of the states of 
world where every situation the plane may encounter is identified and the proper 
response determined. So it seems that under this definition, a plane’s autopilot 
must be an autonomous robot. 
Perhaps, however consider the following difficulty. There is an object in 
the plane which is such that if you take it out, the plane does not have an autopilot 
anymore. Is this object an autopilot? In a sense ‘yes’, yet in itself this is just a 
computer that regulates its outputs in function of its inputs. By itself it cannot do 
anything, certainly not fly a plane. In order to do that, this device has to be 
properly attached, integrated into the complex physical, chemical, electric, 
electronic and hydraulic system that constitutes a modern plane. In order to sense 
the world and react to changes in the environment it has to be connected to, or 
coupled with, or better it has to become part of the whole system which is the 
plane itself. That is why, I submit, an autopilot cannot be considered to be either 
an autonomous robot or even simply a robot, because it can only act and sense its 
environment to the extent that it is inseparably united to the plane, with which it 
forms a unique system. Is the plane itself a robot, autonomous or otherwise? 
Answering that question sends us back to the perplexities mentioned earlier. What 
is a robot? The category of robot is too ill-defined, as argued above, to allow a 
clear answer to the question: ‘Is this or that object a robot?’ The autopilot is 
nonetheless an embodied intelligent artificial agent, but it is embodied in a 
particular way. 
Using that same criteria to define an autonomous robot, is a drone that 
takes off, flies and lands by itself, that accomplishes its mission independently and 
then returns to base, an autonomous robot? It has on board a complex 
sophisticated autopilot, which is one of the systems that allow it to be autonomous. 
Is it a robot? If so, for what reason should we consider it an autonomous robot 
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when the autopilot taken by itself is not? Essentially, because the drone satisfies 
the second socio-functional criterion of a robot: the drone does what a plane with 
a human pilot, and perhaps some other member of an on-board crew, would do. 
That second criterion however, as argued earlier, is not well-defined, and the 
claim that such a drone is an autonomous robot reflects its social role and the way 
it fulfills it, rather than intrinsic characteristics of the machine that it is.  
Yet there is a central difference between the drone and the plane’s 
autopilot. The drone is an individual, while an autopilot—either the one which the 
drone has on board or one that we find in modern plane—is not. It is just ‘part of’, 
an element in a larger system. My suspicion is that, faithful to Čapek’s original 
use of the term, we spontaneously tend to consider as robots, artificial agents 
which are individuals, but that our intuitions leave us relatively in the dark 
whenever we are faced with artificial agents that are differently embodied. What 
is it then that makes an autonomous drone an individual? 
Many years ago Francisco Varela argued that one of the defining 
characteristic of an autopoietic system is that it has a border in physical space that 
topologically delimits where the processes that define the system take place 
(Varela 1989). An autonomous drone is not, by far, an autopoietic system, but its 
border in physical space plays a somewhat related role, something which is not 
the case for an autopilot. More precisely, what the autopilot lacks is not a border 
in physical space; it is after all a physical object which you can move, install or 
remove. Rather, it is that where it acts, how it acts, what it senses, what it can and 
cannot do, is completely independent of the limits in space that determine it as the 
physical object that it is. To put it otherwise, what determines it as an object in 
physical space has no relation whatsoever to what it can do,4 and, as mentioned 
earlier, by itself it cannot do very much!5 To the contrary, what the drone can and 
cannot do is inseparable from what determines it as the physical object that it is. 
Of course, what it can do also depends on its characteristics as an artificial 
intelligent agent; however, the drone’s characteristics as an intelligent agent are 
not independent of its physical characteristics, while the characteristics of the 
autopilot as an intelligent agent are independent of its characteristic as a physical 
object, though they are not independent of the physical characteristics of the plane. 
There is more to this however: an autonomous drone is only autonomous to the 
extent that ground control allows it to be. At any point in time controllers can take 
control of the drone and direct it as they want. When that happens the drone 
																																								 																				
4	This	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 its	 physical	 characteristics	 have	 no	 relation	 whatsoever	 to	 what	 it	
could	do,	were	it	to	be	installed	as	part	of	a	larger	system.	
5	Which	also	means,	a	point	to	which	we	will	return,	that	considered	as	a	physical	object	it	is	not	
an	agent.	
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remains the same physical object that it is, though in the proper sense it becomes a 
different physical system. Does the drone cease to be an autonomous robot as a 
result? Clearly its margin of autonomy has been reduced or constrained. However, 
as long as it still exists, it is autonomous and further it seems that the drone 
continues to satisfy the second criteria. More to the point however, does the drone 
continue to be an individual agent? In this case, the answer seems to be a 
straightforward ‘yes’. No matter the extent to which its margin of autonomy has 
been reduced, the drone, just as a soldier, private or officer, remains an individual 
agent even though it is embedded in a hierarchical command structure.  
What we have here are two different types of technical objects, two 
different types of artificial intelligent agents. The distinction between these two 
types of artificial agents is more important to understand the social impact of 
these technical objects than knowing whether they are robots, autonomous or not. 
One type of artificial agent is embodied as an individual and will generally be 
spontaneously considered as a robot. What it can do in the world is closely related 
to what it is as a physical object. The other is embodied as part of a larger system, 
what it can do in the world depends on the characteristics of that system. From 
here on I will refer to these two types of artificial agents as individual artificial 
agents and systemic artificial agents.6 
Autonomous individual artificial agents and systemic intelligent agents 
correspond to two different directions in robotics research. They also correspond 
to different research interests and motivations. These two different directions of 
research are highly interrelated since building an autonomous individual agent 
requires embedding in it numerous systemic intelligent agents that react 
autonomously to changes in the environment. They constitute preconditions for 
the robotic agent to be able to do the many things it does, i.e. walking, following 
its human partner’s gaze, picking up a ball, extending its arm, etc. Whatever this 
robot does however, whether it is painting a car fender or being a receptionist, 
also depends on its physical characteristics and not only on the intelligent agents it 
contains. Because of this, these artificial agents are identifiable physical objects 
which can be individualized by human observers. Systemic intelligent agents, on 
the other hand, are invisible, not only because as physical objects, as elements of a 
larger system, they are usually hidden inside the machine, beneath its visible 
surface, but also because they essentially are what may be called analytic agents. 
They are analytic agents in the sense that they do not do what they do. That is to 
																																								 																				
6	Of	course	individuals	can	be	embedded	as	parts	of	larger	systems.	The	characteristics	of	these	
higher-level	 systems	 will	 depend,	 among	 other	 things,	 on	 whether	 or	 not,	 and	 the	 extent	 to	
which,	their	parts	retain	their	individuality.	
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say, whatever action they are responsible for takes place at a higher hierarchical 
level in the system in which they are embedded. 
Japanese anime and manga like Astro Boy, Gundam, Patlabor, or Neon 
Genesis Evangelion focus on autonomous or semi-autonomous robots, on 
individual artificial agents, as do some films in the United States, for examples, 
those in the Iron Man series. These machines are tremendously powerful and 
dangerous physical objects that can be either good or evil, or that can be put either 
to good or bad use, but with which, in a sense, we can deal just as we deal with 
other individuals that populate our common world. A central characteristic of such 
agents or robots is that they are visible, identifiable agents. We can transparently 
attribute to them their actions in the world. Actions for which they may be or may 
not be morally responsible, but which we can in any case clearly attribute to them. 
Whether it is autonomous or controlled from somewhere in the United States, it is 
the drone which one can hear and see in Pakistan that shoots the Hellfire missile 
and in that sense it is the agent. 
Popular films, like The Matrix, Terminator or more recently 
Transcendence, to the contrary, focus on invisible mystical logical entities, the 
mythical personification of systemic artificial intelligent agents that, interestingly 
enough, it seems can only be evil. A central characteristic of systemic intelligent 
artificial agents is that they are invisible, or if you prefer, they are essentially 
analytic agents, and in consequence they give rise to actions that cannot be 
attributed to any agent in particular, that cannot be attributed to anyone. 
A common example can illustrate this. Sometimes when using your credit 
card online or in an ATM, the operation is refused. Since you know who you are 
and know that there are sufficient funds in your account, you wonder why this 
takes place. An intelligent artificial agent is to blame, which essentially is an 
algorithm that takes into account different kinds of information, i.e. your past 
traveling and buying habits, whether you made any mistakes punching in your 
security code, etc. Based upon this information, it calculates the likelihood that 
you could now be in France spending such a large amount of money, and in view 
of certain objectives (for example, to allow customers access to their money, but 
also to prevent theft and fraud), decides either to authorize the transaction, or not. 
To make things worse, suppose that the machine now refuses to give you back 
your credit card. Who has done that? The artificial agent? But it is only a piece of 
code which cannot do anything by itself and now, with cloud computing, which is 
probably properly nowhere! In order to do anything whatsoever, to accept or 
reject the transaction, to keep your credit card or to give it back, the artificial 
agent needs to be part of a much larger system that comprises identifiable physical 
objects with which you interact (the ATM or computer screen), numerous other 
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physical systems which most likely you will never see (data centers), many other 
systemic intelligent artificial agents in complex interrelation, the internet, banking 
procedures, and so on. In other words, it needs to be part of a complex system, of 
which this particular intelligent artificial agent constitutes a minute, though 
essential part. In order to act, an analytical agent needs to be embodied in some 
way, but as a systemic agent, the way it is embodied does not individuate it as a 
particular identifiable physical agent.  
So who has done this? Who has refused your transaction and decided to 
keep your bank card? The answer is ‘no one in particular!’ What did it was an 
invisible, mythical entity, the ‘system’ that is omnipresent because it is nowhere 
in particular. In this case, it is true that a ‘system’ did it, but this claim here cannot 
be reduced to the confused expression of a paranoid conspiracy theory. It is not 
‘the system’ but a system that has specifiable characteristic and that has been 
constructed to achieve particular goals and objectives. 
Systemic artificial intelligent agents work for humans, just as individual 
artificial agents or robots do, but not quite in the same way. The one we have been 
talking about replaces a bank teller or store clerk in some of his or her functions. 
It would be more adequate to say that it does away with them, because what was 
previously done by a person is now not done by anyone at all, but nonetheless 
happens. The main danger and consequence of the growing number of systemic 
artificial agents in everyday life transactions is not that they threaten to become 
too intelligent and to take over the world, but that the more things they do for us, 
the more tasks they accomplish in our stead, the more they curtail, rather than 
augment, our ability to act.7 The way in which they do this is not so much by 
constraining us directly. Rather, they tend to pre-empt our actions. As a 
consequence, they often impose that whatever has to be done is either done in the 
‘one right way’ which they provide or not done at all!8 The above statement is not 
entirely correct. It is not they, the artificial systemic agents, who ultimately curtail 
rather than enhance our freedom of action, because systemic intelligent agents are 
analytical agents who can only act or do something within a much broader system 
that ultimately is socially determined. What curtails our ability to act—to the 
extent to which this is the case—ultimately depends on the reasons why we resort 
to the socio-technical systems of which they are part, and on the goals which we 
pursue by institutionalizing these systems. 
This transformation of our capability for acting raises fundamental 
political questions, that we should be asking and that very often we do not ask, 
																																								 																				
7	For	an	interesting	and	early	analysis	of	the	dangers	of	such	agents	see	Lessig	(2006).	
8	For	example,	if	you	are	living	in	Japan,	try	inputting	your	real	address	in	a	webpage	which	rules	
that	street	addresses	must	always	start	with	numbers!	
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because we fail to see these socio-technical transformations as the result of social 
and political choices. Rather we tend to see them as a form of technological 
determinism and tend to see the problems as merely technological. Because 
individual artificial agents are social agents, somewhat in the way in which human 
beings are social agents, individual artificial agents pose quite different types of 
problems than do systemic artificial agents. Unlike systemic agents, individual 
artificial agents are not invisible and they are not anonymous, at least not 
anonymous in the sense that it is always possible to attribute the action to the 
agent. This difference is fundamental and it suggests a limit to actor-network 
theory, for in its desire not to erase distinctions between human agents and 
technical objects, as part of networks of action, actor-network theory overlooks 
the difference between different types of agents, whether artificial or natural. 
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